

## 6801. Theories of International Relations. Fall 2021.

Mondays, 2:10-4:00 in 1302 International Affairs  
Jack Snyder -- jls6@columbia.edu; office: 1327 IAB  
office hours:

7/4/2021

### Requirements:

(1) Three essays based on readings on the syllabus, 6 to 8 pages each, due on October 18, November 15, and December 13. These should address a single, focused question pertaining to a related group of two to four readings, such as a theoretical debate or the progress of a research program. Each essay should make a central argument answering the question that you pose. Topics might address such issues as the deductive coherence of the theory, the relationship between the logic of a theory and the empirical methods used to test it, the repair of theories in light of testing, how agency is related to structure in the theory, the criteria used to evaluate theory, how change is theorized, the effectiveness of debates in assessing, refining, developing, and refuting theory, and so forth. Each essay is 25% of your grade for the course.

(2) A timed final exam, taking the form of a mock international relations comprehensive PhD exam, answering one question from the World Politics A section of the exam. December 20, 2:00-4:00. 20% of your grade.

(3) Regular, active, well-informed class participation, including at least one assignment to help lead part of the discussion. 5%.

Readings: Required readings are on electronic reserve via Courseworks. Journal articles and some e-books are available through the library reserves function on Courseworks. Some readings, especially scanned book chapters, are available in the Files function on Courseworks. Some but not all supplementary readings are also on e-reserve or in the Files. The purpose of the supplementary readings is to suggest material for the reading response papers. Asterisk (\*) indicates a paperback ordered at the Columbia Barnes and Noble bookstore in the basement under Lerner Hall. Book purchases are optional.

Sept. 13. *What's a theory (of IR), what's it for, and how should it be evaluated?*

In terms of originality, impact, and staying power, these are among a handful of the most successful works of IR theory ever. What did they do right? Why did they lead to productive research programs?

\*Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 1-18, 88-99, 102-128, 163-176.

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; or \*Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, ch. 6, "Three Cultures of Anarchy," pp. 246-312.

Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214.

Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "How Not to Be Lakatos Intolerant," *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (June 2002), pp. 231-262. How to evaluate whether a research program is making progress or just explaining away its failures.

*International Organization*, special issue on Covid-19 and the future of international relations, 2020: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/information/io-covid-19-online-supplemental-issue>

#### SUPPLEMENTARY:

Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, pp. 91-196.

Elman and Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory*, Lakatosian evaluation of power transition, institutional, and other IR research programs.

Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*, ch. 1. Explanation by causal mechanism.

Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics*, 3-43; "as if" theories.

Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, ch. 3-5.

Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, ch. 1-3.

Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry*.

Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, esp. Schimmelfennig, "Efficient Process Tracing" (e-book, 2014); James Mahoney, "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation," *Security Studies*, April-June 2015, on "hoop tests" and "smoking guns."

John G. Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998), pp. 855-885. Readable, comprehensive overview.

Kimberly Hutchings and Patricia Owens, "Women Thinkers and the Canon of International Thought: Recovery, Rejection, and Reconstitution," *APSR* 115:2 (May 2021): 347-359.

Sept. 20. *Structure and agency in IR research programs.*

These days we hear a lot about microfoundations, but little about "macrofoundations." This week we will read the work of IR rationalists as well as analysts of the impact of international structural systemic constraints on foreign policy. Both are interested in the relationship between agency and structure.

\*David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, read chaps. by Lake and Powell, 3-38, and Frieden, 39-76; optional chapters: Morrow, 77-114, Rogowski, 115-139, and Stein, 197-228.

Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, 32, Autumn 1978, pp. 881-911, which includes a discussion of Gerschenkron in analyzing the impact of the

international system on state structure and domestic politics. Or substitute \*Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times*, ch. 3-4, which is an easier read.

Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, chapters 16-20. This is like reading the daily newspaper in today's era of neoliberalism and populist backlash, but it is written in an oblique style, so you may need background to understand it. For helpful context, start with Robert Kuttner, "The Man from Red Vienna," *New York Review of Books* December 21, 2017, at <https://www.nybooks-com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/articles/2017/12/21/karl-polanyi-man-from-red-vienna/>. Then read Ruggie, then take a look at Polanyi's book.

John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36:2 (Spring 1982). This extends Polanyi to understand the Bretton-Woods system.

Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, ch. 1. The impact of late development on the structure of the state and the nature of its ruling coalition. Implications for ideology and foreign policy are in his other book, *Bread and Democracy in Germany*. Compare to Yuen Yuen Ang, *How China Escaped the Poverty Trap*, for the Dec. 14 class.

Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, Summer 1987, 335-370. Not an easy read, but skim this canonical article.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY:

James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," *Handbook of International Relations* (2002 ed.), eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons. Structure and agency.

David A. Lake, "Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19 (2013), pp. 567-587.

James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics*, January 1991. Rationality as the default standard in counterfactuals.

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59:1 (January 2005). Four types: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive.

David Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," *World Politics* 24 (1971).

Sept. 27. *Strategy and bargaining in anarchical systems* (co-taught with Richard Betts)

\*John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, ch. 5.

James D. Fearon (1995), "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

\*Dan Reiter, *How Wars End*, ch. 3, "Credible Commitments and War Termination."

\*Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, ch. 2; also browse ch. 8, 9.

Stacie Goddard, "When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power," *International Security* 33, Winter 2008/09, pp. 110-42.

Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, spring 1993.

Steven Pinker, *Better Angels of Our Nature*, pp. xxi-xxvi, 31-85, 190-200, 684-692, and critique by Bear Braumoeller, *Only the Dead* (Oxford U. P., 2019), chapters 2-3, and 9 (chapter 6 optional).

\*Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret edition only: Book I, Chaps. 1, 2, and 7 (conceptualization of war, “friction”); Book III, Chap. 1 (connects with Schelling); Book VII, Chap. 22 (“The Culminating Point of Victory,” when to stop in limited war, skim and compare with Reiter); Book VIII, Chap. 2 (absolute and real war), Book VIII, Chap. 3 pp. 582-589 only, and Chap. 6 (war as instrument of policy).

Erica Borghard and Shawn Lonergan, “The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace,” *Security Studies* 26: 3 (2017). Schelling applied to cyberconflict. Optional for cyber buffs.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY:

Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, ch. 2.

Joshua S. Goldstein, *Winning the War on War*, ch. 2 & 10, discussion of Goldstein, *Winning...*, in “Symposium: Has Violence Declined in World Politics? *Perspectives on Politics* 11:2, June 2013.

Fazal, Tanisha M. “State Death in the International System,” *International Organization* 58 (April 2004), pp. 311-344.

Fearon, James D. 1998. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” *International Organization* 52 (2): 269–305.

Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” *International Organization* 54 (2000), pp. 325-357.

Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help,” *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994), pp. 50-91.

Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics*, 50:1 (October 1997), 171-201.

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, ch. 2 and 3.

Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices,” *International Theory* 3:1 (2011), 1-36. Bargaining as both individual agency and structured in a community; plays off Schelling.

Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations*, ch. 3-4.

Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” *International Organization* 49 (Spring 1995).

J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, ch. 2, “Man, the State, and War.”

Rose McDermott, “Sex and Death: Gender Differences in Aggressions and Motivations for Violence,” *International Organization* 69:3 (summer 2015), 753-775.

Robert Jervis, *System Effects*, ch. 2, 4, 5, and 7.

Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, ch. 6, on “the third image.”

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, ch. 8, 3d ed. Precursor of bargaining theory.

Stephen Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” *World Politics* 38:1 (Oct. 1985), 80-117.

Robert Powell, “Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power,” *International Organization* 69:3 (Summer 2015), 589-626, formal model of “stability-instability paradox.”

Jack S. Levy, “Clausewitz and People’s War,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40:3 (2017),

450-456.

Danielle Charette, "David Hume's Balancing Act," *APSR* 115:1 (Feb. 2021): 69-81.

Balance of power and balance of trade—iron laws or rhetorical devices?

Oct. 4. *Origins and evolution of states systems and regional subsystems; how to theorize change in IR.*

John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," *World Politics* 35 (January 1983), review essay of Waltz.

William Wohlforth et al, "Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History," *European Journal of International Relations* 13:2 (June 2007), 155-185.

Abraham Newman and Henry Farrell, "The Janus Face of the Liberal International Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining," *International Organization* 75:2 (Spring 2021), special issue on "Challenges to the Liberal International Order," 333-358. Endogenous theory of change.

READ ANY TWO OF THE FOLLOWING THREE:

- \*1. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, ch. 3-4. War made the state, and the state made war, and eventually they both made nationalism and popular sovereignty.
- \*2. Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, ch. 5. Alliance of crown and town.
- \*3. Daniel Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*, ch. 2-4. The Reformation did it by reorganizing identity networks.

SUPPLEMENTARY (READ ONE IN YOUR AREA OF INTEREST):

Hendrik Spruyt, "Institutional Selection in International Relations," *International Organization* 52 (1998), 855-85; similar to Spruyt, ch. 8.

Victoria Tin-bor Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe," *International Organization*, winter 2004, and Victoria Hui, *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*, ch. 4.

Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty*, ch. 1 and 2.

Marcus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practice," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 427-466.

Julia Costa Lopez, "Political Authority in International Relations: Revisiting the Medieval Debate," *International Organization* 74:2 (Spring 2020), 222-252, distinguishes four types of authority.

Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organization*, Spring 2004. How sovereignty norms came to ASEAN.

Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn*, ch. 2. Internationalist versus nationalist coalitions; Middle East case.

David Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," *International Security*, spring 2003. Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" *International Security*, winter 2003-04. David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," *International Security*, winter 2003-04.

- Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, ch. 1-3. Claims that the moral purposes of domestic society are reflected in the norms of regional and historical international societies; short version in *IO* fall 1997.
- Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism*. Ancient Chinese were realists, but realist ideas arose from and were transmitted through culture.
- Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*; Ernest Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*: functionalist versus intergovernmentalist theories of regional integration.
- Johannes Gerschewski, "Explanations of Institutional Change," *APSR* 115:1 (Feb. 2021): 218-233. 2x2 crossing endogenous/exogenous with gradual/disruptive.

Oct. 11. *The Democratic Peace research program: "the closest we have to a law"?* (co-taught with Michael Doyle)

- John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19:2 (fall 1994): 87-125.
- Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, 205-212, 251-300, 474-484.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93 (December 1999), pp. 791-807.
- Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," *American Political Science Review* 92 (June 1998), 377-89; or Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War*, ch. 2 and browse.
- Michael Tomz and Jessica Weeks, "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 107:4 (November 2013), 849-865.
- Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science*, Jan. 2007.
- Joanne Gowa, "The Democratic Peace after the Cold War," *Economics & Politics* 23:2 (2011), 153-171. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00382.x>
- John Mearsheimer, "Bound to Fail," *International Security*, spring 2019.
- G. John Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs* (London) 94:1 (January 2018), 7-23; or Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order* (Yale 2020).
- International Organization* 75:2 (Spring 2021), special issue on "Challenges to the Liberal International Order," introductory essay by Lake, Martin, and Risse.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY:

- Kenneth Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* 53:2 (Spring 1999), pp. 233-266.
- Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chs. 1, 3, 4 (through p. 97).
- Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, chapters 1-4.
- Michael Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," *International Security* 27:2 (Fall 2002), 5-47. Critique of Reiter and Stam; Alexander Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies?" *International Security* 33:4 (Spring 2009), 9-51. Rebuttals to Reiter and Stam.

Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," *American Political Science Review* 104, No. 3 (2010): 430–45.

Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51 (4), 513-53.

Oct. 18. *Democracies and Autocracies in the International System*

*Strategic interaction and bargaining between democracies and autocracies:*

James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88 (September 1994), 577-592.

Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," *International Organization* (Fall 2007), 821-840.

Jessica Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62:1 (Winter 2008): 35-64.

Jessica Chen Weiss, "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China," *International Organization* 67 (January 2013), 1-35.

Jessica Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 106 (May 2012), 326-47.

Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," *American Political Science Review* (August 2011), 437-458.

Jayme R. Schlesinger and Jack S. Levy "Politics, audience costs, and signalling: Britain and the 1863–4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis," *European Journal of International Security* (First View, April 12, 2021), doi:10.1017/eis.2021.7.

Kai Quek and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Can China Back Down? Crisis De-escalation in the Shadow of Popular Opposition," *International Security* 42:3 (Winter 2017/18), 7-37.

*International-systemic and state-level causes of regime type:*

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 155-83. Economic preconditions of democratic consolidation.

Carles Boix, "Democracy, Development, and the International System," *American Political Science Review*, November 2011

Seva Gunitsky, "From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century," *International Organization* 68 (Summer 2014), 561-598, or Gunitsky, *Aftershocks* (2017), ch. 1-2.

SUPPLEMENTARY

Alexander Downes and Todd Sechser, "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization* 66, Summer 2012, 457-89.

Danielle Lupton, *Reputation for Resolve* (Cornell, 2020). Blurb: "most important statement on reputations in international relations in a decade."

Susan Hyde and Elizabeth Saunders, "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space," *International Organization* 74:2 (Spring 2020), 363-395. Progressive problem shift or degeneration of audience cost theory?

Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge, 2012).

Timothy Frye, *Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia* (Princeton, 2021)

Oct. 25. *Globalization and its Critics* (co-taught with Allison Carnegie)

*Too Much Global Governance?*

Chapter by Joseph Stiglitz, "The Overselling of Globalization," in Michael M. Weinstein, *Globalization: What's New?* 2005 (e-book).

Dani Rodrik, "Populism and the Economics of Globalization," *Journal of International Business Policy* 2018.

*Not Enough?*

William Nordhaus, "The Climate Club: How to Fix a Failing Global Effort," *Foreign Affairs* 99:3 May/June 2020.

Jeffrey Frieden, "The Governance of International Finance," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 19 (2016), 33-48

*Too Much in Some Areas?*

Jeffrey Ding & Allan Dafoe. 2021. "The Logic of Strategic Assets: From Oil to AI." *Security Studies*.

Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield, "Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major Power Trade," *International Organization* 58:4 (October 2004).

*Too Much for Some People?*

J. Lawrence Broz, Jeffrey Frieden and Stephen Weymouth, "Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash," *International Organization* 75:2 (Spring 2021).

Iain Osgood and Margaret Peters, "Escape Through Export? Women-Owned Enterprises, Domestic Discrimination, and Global Markets," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 12:2 (September 2017): 143-183.

SUPPLEMENTARY

Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, "The Instruments of Trade Policy," in *International*



- Economics: Theory and Policy* (Pearson, Addison, Wesley, 2003), chapter 8.
- Ronald Rogowski, "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," *American Political Science Review* 81:4 (December 1987): 1121-1137.
- James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan, "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2:2 (1994), 165-192.
- Torben Iversen, David Soskice, and Carles Boix, "Critical Dialogues, Reviews and Responses: *Democracy and Prosperity* and *Democratic Capitalism at the Crossroads*," *Perspectives on Politics* 18:2 (June 2020): 545-551.
- Benjamin O. Fordham, "The Domestic Politics of World Power: Explaining Debates over the United States Battleship Fleet, 1890-91," *International Organization* 73:2 (spring 2019): 435-468.
- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "Protection for Sale," *The American Economic Review* 84: 4 (Sept. 1994), 833-850.
- Jeffrey Frieden, "Invested Interests," *International Organization* 45:4 (Autumn 1991), 425-451.
- Helen Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, ch. 1-4, & browse 5-8 chap.
- Joanne Gowa and Raymond Hicks, "Big Treaties, Small Effects: The RTAA Agreements," *World Politics* 70:2 (April 2018), 165-193.
- Robert C. Feenstra and Alan M. Taylor. 2008, "Gains and Losses from Trade in the Specific-Factors Model," ch. 3, and "Trade and Resources: The Heckscher Ohlin Model," ch. 4, in Feenstra and Taylor, *International Trade*, 2d ed (2008).

Nov. 1. NO CLASS—UNIVERSITY HOLIDAY

Nov. 8. *International organization* (co-taught with Allison Carnegie)

*What do IOs do?*

1) Solve coordination problems:

\*Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 7-10, 85-98 (top), and 111-116.

2) Solve a terms-of-trade problem.

Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger. 2010. "The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice." *Annual Review of Economics* 2:223—256.

3) Provide a domestic commitment or issue linkage device:

Davis, Christina. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 153-69.

ANOTHER OPTION ON THIS TOPIC: Buthe, T. and H. V. Milner. 2008. The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI Through International Trade Agreements?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):741-762.

## 4) "Not much:"

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoon. 1996. "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (3): 379–406.

Note also Grieco and Mearsheimer in supplemental readings.

## 5) Solve political hold-up problems:

Allison Carnegie, "States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 108:1(2014): 54-70.

## 6) Constructivist view:

Michael N. Barnett, and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organization." *International Organization* 53:4 (1999.): 699-732.

## 7) Solve private information problems:

Carnegie and Carson. *The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations*. *AJPS*. 63:2: 269-285.

*What shapes the design of IOs?*

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55 (4): 761–799.

Copelovitch and Putnam, "Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation," *International Organization* 68:2 (Spring 2014): 471-493.

## SUPPLEMENTARY:

Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42:3 (summer 1988).

Steinberg, Richard. 2002. In the Shadow of Law and Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-374.

Dai, Xinyuan. 2002. "Information Systems in Treaty Regimes." *World Politics* 54 (4), 405-436.

Pollack, Mark A. 1997. "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community." *International Organization* 51 (1): 99–134.

Mitchell, R. B. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance," *International Organization*, 1994, 48, 425-458.

Krasner, "Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43:3 (April 1991): 336-66.

Page Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," *International Organization* 57:2 (Spring 2003), 337-372.

Erik Voeten, "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001), 845-58.

Erik Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force," *International Organization* 59 (Summer 2005), 527-557.

John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, winter 1994/1995.

Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *International Organization*. 42(3): 485-507, on relative gains.

Nov. 15. *Norms, Rights, and Persuasion*

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, autumn 1998.

Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance," *International Organization* 47:2 (1993): 175–206.

Thomas Risse, "Let's argue! Communicative action in world politics," *International Organization* 54 (Winter 2000), pp. 1-39.

Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's...Campaign against the Slave Trade," *International Organization*, fall 1999.

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (1998). (Brief excerpt in courseworks files from Mingst and Snyder, *Essential Readings*, pp. 310-320.)

Emilie Hafner-Burton, "Sticks and Stones: The Efficacy of Human Rights 'Naming and Shaming,'" *International Organization* 62:4 (2008).

Beth A. Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 12-17 (overview of argument) and Ch. 7, pp. 256-306, on the torture convention.

Erica Chenoweth, "The Future of Nonviolent Resistance," *Journal of Democracy* 31:3, July 2020, 69-84, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0046>.

SUPPLEMENTARY:

Jeff Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe," *International Organization* 59:4 (October 2005), 801-826, introduction to special issue, counterpoint to Finnemore and Sikkink.

James D. Morrow, "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101:3 (August 2007), pp. 559-572.

Emilie Hafner-Burton, Edward Mansfield, and Jon Pevehouse, "Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization," *British Journal of Political Science* 45:1 (January 2015), 1-27.

Nov. 22. *Perception and signaling* (co-taught with Robert Jervis and Keren Yarhi-Milo)

\*Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, preface to the new edition, pp. xiii-xc.

Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," in Kristen Monroe, ed., *Political Psychology*, 293-312.

Rose McDermott, "The Psychological Ideas of Amos Tversky and Their Relevance for Political Science," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13:1 (January 2001), 5-33.

Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," *International Organization* 64 (Winter 2010), pp.

- 1-31 (also see his “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” IO 67 (Spring 2013), 221-52, and, for an overview by several scholars, “Forum: Emotions and World Politics,” *International Theory* 6 (November 2014), 490-594).
- Robert Jervis, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and Don Casler, “Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship,” *World Politics* 73:1 (January 2021), 167-203.
- Keren Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries,” *International Security* 38 (Summer 2013), 7-51.
- Richard H. Thaler, “Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, and Future,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 106, No. 7 (July 2016), 1577-1600.
- Joshua Kertzer and Dustin Tingley, “Political Psychology in International Relations, Beyond the Paradigms,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 21, 2018.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY OR REVIEW FROM PREVIOUS WEEKS

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Dec. 13. *Whither international politics: theory as a guide to the future?* (co-taught with Thomas Christensen)

- Peter Katzenstein, *Civilizations in World Politics*, ch. 1. Multiple modernities?
- \*John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, updated 2014 ed., 360-411.
- \*Alastair Ian Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000* (Princeton University Press, 2008), chs. 1 and 3, pp. 1-44 and 74-154, and review Johnston from Oct. 15.
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